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As was seen in Chapter III, the import procedures and regulations existing
prior to August 1958 were rescinded with the announcement of the Stabiliza-
tion Program. Import Programs became the major regulatory instrument gov-
erning imports thereafter, and have remained so since then.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the detailed workings of the
Turkish import regime: the criteria used and intent of government officials in
deciding upon the Import Programs, the procedures and regulations governing
imports of various kinds, and the way in which the import regime functioned.
Each of these three aspects forms the subject of a section below. But before
turning to these subjects in detail, it will be useful to have an overview of the
import regime, the subject of the first section.
I. The Import Programs and lists
Each Import Program has contained a statement of the procedures to be
followed in applying for import licenses and a list of regulations governing
importation. In addition each Program has itemized the commodities eligible
for importation under each of two lists: the Liberalized List and the Quota
List. Commodities not enumerated on either list are not legally importable.1
Although there is no such thing, it is convenient to refer to commodities not
included on an import list as being on the 'Prohibited List."
The first Import Program was promulgated in September 1958, the second
in February 1959, and the third in August 1959. Thereafter, Import Programs
were issued semi-annually: from 1961 on they were issued early in January
and July of each year. In 1969 import regulations and the Liberalized List
were made valid for the full year so that only the Quota List was issued under
the midyear Import Program.2 The Import Programs have been consecutively
numbered. Thus "Import Program No. 26" was issued in January
1.Some items axe designated by use, as, for example, "Articles required in connection
with the production and assembly of tractors."
2. In 1971, the Quota List was also made valid for the full year. However, quotas were to
be used semi-annually.
3. Each Import Program was published in the Official Gazette and reprinted by the
Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Union of Chambers. The titles
have differed somewhat from time to time.
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QuotaList imports were generally about two-thirds the value of Liberal-
ized List imports, though the ratio varied from time to time (see Table VI-3
below). The determination as to whether an item was eligible for importation
at all, and if so on which list, was basic to the import regime. The Import
Programs for Quota List items indicated the dollar value of licenses to be
issued, and the procedures for allocation of those amounts then began. They
involved determination of the amount of the quota going to the public and
private sectors, and allocation of import licenses to individual private sector
producers.
The value of imports of Liberalized List items was not indicated, as the
intent was that licenses should be issued freely to all applicants, It will be
seen below that this did not always happen, for a variety of reasons.
Between two-thirds and three-quarters of all imports entered directly
under the Liberalized List and the Quota List. Other categories of imports
were "Bilateral Agreement Imports" and "Self-Financed Imports." A Bilater-
al Quota List, publithed separately from the Import Program, enumerated the
items eligible for importation from countries with which Turkey had bilateral
trade agreements. Despite the fact that the list was published separately, the
Liberalized List—Quota List distinction of the Import Program was still domi-
nant, in that no item was eligible for importation under a bilateral agreement
that was not included on one of the lists in the Import Program.
"Self-Financed Imports" were chiefly capital goods imported in connection
with investments made under project aid. They were almost entirely for
investments within the public sector and thus were government imports.
Other "Self-Financed Imports" included PL 480 shipments and various miscel-
laneous items.
The key decisions made in formulating the Import Programs were: (1) the
determination of which items were eligible for importation; (2) the designa-
tion of which eligible items should be on each list; and (3) the value of
licenses to be allocated in each quota category. In addition, several other
aspects of the Import Programs were important. The height of guarantee
deposit requirements against license applications for items on each list was
announced, and the period for which licenses were to be valid, the procedures
to be followed in the event of delay and other administrative aspects of the
system were spelled out.
In the latter part of the 1960's an additional feature assumed increasing
importance: many categories of eligible imports on both lists became subject
to "Ministerial approval." Enumeration on a list was no longer sufficient to
insure importation of those items: approval from the designated Ministry had
to be obtained first. It will be seen below that the requirement of Ministerial
approval gave the government greatly increased control over the detailed
allocation of importlicenses.
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II. The formulation of Import Programs
As indicated above, the Import Programs became the basic instrument in
determining the import regime in 1958. The Import Programs retained their
function when the SPO was organized, although the process by which they
were formulated was altered as SPO assumed a larger role in their determina-
tion. Reference in what follows is to the period since 1962 when the Import
Programs have been formulated in conjunction with the Plans and the Annual
Programs.
There are many stages in the formulation of the Import Programs, and
virtually all of them involve formal and informal consultations among many
government nunistries. There are almost no public records from these consul-
tations, and the substance of the procedures probably varies with the fortunes
and political influence of various cabinet ministers and other parties in the
negotiating process. Thus any description of the formulation of the programs
will fail to capture the degree to which political and subjective factors in-
fluence the process and in addition will make the procedures appear to be
more cut-and-dried than they in fact are.
With that important caveat in mind, four stages of the process of formulat-
ing the Import Program can be distinguished: (1) the SPO projects import
"requirements"; (2) those requirements are allocated globally among lists and
financing sources; (3) a determination is made of which imported commodi-
ties are to be on each list; and (4) negotiations are carried out to determine
the value of each Quota List item. Bearing in mind that these stages are not
sequential and that the process really contains a fair amount of iteration, we
consider each of the stages in turn.4
SF0 projections of import requirements
The SPO starts by estimating import requirements by end-use: for con-
sumption goods, investment goods and raw materials. These estimates are
based upon the anticipated volume of investment (for investment-goods im-
ports) and industrial production (for raw materials and intermediate goods).
Consumption imports are projected primarily on the basis of past levels. Once
these projections are established, the estimated amount of incremental im-
port-substitution production in each category is subtracted from the totals,
thus yielding estimates of net import requirements by end-use category. The
value of "Self-Financed Imports" is then estimated. PL 480 imports are sub-
4. Except as otherwise indicated, the information contained in this section is based upon
numerous interviews with persons associated with the process of formulating the
Import Program
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tracted from consumption-goods import requirements, and imports financed
by project credits are subtracted from investment-goods import requirements.
The resulting figures are taken as the control totals which the Import Program
must satisfy.
Some iteration is involved even at this stage, since the value of imports
projected under the Import Program must be reconciled with expected for-
eign.exchange availability. The totals in both this and the next stage are
adjusted and recomputed to conform with foreign-exchange considerations.
The Central Bank provides estimates of the amount of foreign exchange it
expects to be available to pay for imports. However, since the SPO estimates
the expected availability of foreign exchange from program aid and has some
latitude in estimating the likely magnitude of imports financed by project
credits, the Central Bank's estimates are not the sole determinant of the
global total for the Import Program.
The important operational decision is the value of imports to be permitted
under the Quota List. It would appear in practice that this figure is initially
determined as a residual, and later subject to iteration: (1) Liberalized List
imports are projected on the basis of past trends, since (in principle) they are
determined by market forces and hence presumably cannot be controlled
(but see below, Section III); (2) the value of imports under Bilateral Agree-
ments is generally stipulated in the agreements themselves and is taken as a
datum; (3) the sum of imports under the Liberalized List and Bilateral List is
then subtracted from total estimated end-use requirements (as reconciled
with foreign-exchange availability) to yield the total value of imports to be
allotted to quota categories. However, when estimates of Quota List import
values become available after negotiations over the value of Quota List items,
the estimate for the value of Liberalized List items is generally modified, as is
the Quota List figure.
It will be seen below that the import projections by end-use have often
differed from actual imports.5 By contrast, imports by list as indicated in the
Import Programs have generally been very close to the actuals. Since the lists
are what is actually controlled, it is not surprising that projections of the lists
agree much more closely with the actual results than do end-use projections.
What should be noted is that the list totals have little significance for develop-
ment goals. Thus the SPO's decision as to the value of Quota List imports
does not give it effective control over end-use categories.
1
Allocationof end-use requirements among the import lists
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Of major significance is the decision as to the commodities eligible for
importation and their assignment to an import list. SPO generally sets the
criteria for determining the lists, and decisions to alter the lists are made by
the relevant ministries in consultation with the SPO. Usually an item appear-
ing on a given list remains on that list until there is a reason for change; thus
decisions are made at the margin, and commodities seldom jump back and
forth between lists.
At the outset of the FFYP, the SPO set the criterion for inclusion on the
Liberalized List:
Goods of which internal production partly covers internal needs will not be included
in liberalization lists and if already included, will be taken oUt... Import programs will
give priority to imports which contribute to the realization of plan targets. The
import requirements of the industries concerned will be examined and fulfilled in the
light of their implications for the plan.6
Thus the Liberalized List was designed to encompass those commodities
whose importation was deemed necessary for achievement of the develop-
ment plan targets when domestic productive capacity was unavailable. The
Quota List was designed to be more protective and restrictive, covering com-
modities of which there was some domestic production or which were
deemed less essential to development, as in the case of most consumer goods.
Thus vitamins and antibiotics were included on the Liberalized List, whereas
coffee, cocoa and most other consumer goods were included on the Quota
List.
The criterion for removing or transferring a commodity from a list gradual-
ly became centered upon domestic production considerations. Thus when
domestic production of an item on the Liberalized List started, the producer
appealed for the transfer of the commodity. The good was then transferred to
the Quota List if it was determined that the new producer's capacity would
be inadequate to meet domestic demand, or entirely removed from the list of
eligible imports if the additional productive capacity was thought sufficient.
Once domestic production had started, of course, producer pressure to delete
an item from eligibility for importation was persistent.
In the Annual Programs prepared by the SPO, projected domestic produc-
tion and demand figures are given for various sectors of the economy, as are
export figures. Import projections are derived as a residual in the case of
domestically produced goods, and from input-output coefficients for non-
produced inputs. Those import projections cannot often be translated direct-
ly into the lists:for commodities on the Liberalized List, no values are
6. FFYP, op. cit. (Note 20, Chap. I), p. 471.142 TheImport Regime of the 1960's
assigned to individual items; for commodities on the Quota List, the SPO
figures are directly influential only if the import is used by just one sector.'
SPO's projections are nonetheless clearly a dominant element in deter-
mining the Import Program, even though the Annual Program figures are not
precise guides. SPO's influence is generally acknowledged to be considerable;
and itis undoubtedly in the Cabinet-level deliberations as well as the inter-
ministerial negotiations at lower levels that SPO officials are able to transform
their Annual Program estimates into Import Program decisions.
Questions were asked in interviews with SPO officials as to how import
values for individual commodities were estimated by SPO. The responses
indicated that the basic mechanism was incremental projections: past import-
output and import-investment relationships were applied to the projected
increases in output and/or investment to yield import estimates.
In response to the suggestion that if all imports so estimated were exactly
realized and all production targets met such projections would be self-fulfill-
ing in perpetuity and the coefficients constant, officials answered that "short-
ages" did arise and that they quickly became aware of them. It was stated that in
such instances the next Annual Program would take these shortages into
account. When asked whether checks were ever made on differential dispari-
ties between landed cost and domestic selling prices of imports, SPO officials
stated that such checks had not been made, although the magnitude of the
disparities was generally known. It appeared on the basis of these responses
that the basic projection technique was really a "materials balances" ap-
proach, and that price signals yielded by the economy were generally ignored.
The Import Program for the Liberalized List items is complete when the
contents of the list are determined. The list itself contains several qualifica-
tions. Itis specified for some Liberalized List items that permission of a
particular Ministry is required before an import license application can be
made. Some items are also subject to source-restrictions as, for example,
goods eligible for importation only with AID funds.
The determination of Bilateral List imports is made essentially on the basis
of which goods eligible for importation appear to be available from bilateral-
agreement countries. The critical decisions for the Quota List are the value of
quotas for each individual quota category.
Negotiations over the Quota List
Although the Annual Programs prepared by SPO indicate the value of
imports expected by end-use category, by list and by sector, preparation of
7. H. Lubell, D. Mathieson, R. Smith and B. Viragh, The Turkish Import Regime, AID
(Ankara), April 1968.
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the Import Programs in conformity with the Annual Programs is the responsi-
bility of the Ministry of Commerce. The process of determining the value of
each quota item is complex and is conducted under the aegis of the Com-
merce Ministry, with SPO, the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, other
government agencies and the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
taking part.
The Union of Chambers is a semi-official body to which all private sector
firms having ten or more employees must belong. The Union represents the
interests of its members in negotiations over quota values, while the Ministry
of Finance represents the public sector enterprises. The Union and the Fi-
nance Ministry consult with their respective constituents prior to negotiations
over specific quota values. Thus when quota-list negotiations take place the
Union has consulted with its members and has received responses from them
as to their expected import requirements.
There are two types of quotas, commodity-specific and user-specific. Com-
modity-specific quotas, such as electric motors of less than 60 horsepower,
are further allocated between industrialists and importers. Industrialists are
those using the quota-good in their own production process. Imports under
licenses granted to industrialists cannot legally be resold. By contrast, im-
porters are those who import for the purpose of resale without processing.
Each quota value is subdivided into the amount to be allocated to industrial-
ists and the amount for importers.
User-specific quotas are of two general types: (1) those covering the im-
port needs of particular types of assemblers and manufacturers; and (2) in-
vestment-goods quotas. In the first category a quota is set aside for the
importation of goods required in the production process. Firms operating
under these quotas are subject to domestic content requirements. Two invest-
ment—goods quotas are set: (1) for private sector investments, and (2) for
public sector investments. Goods imported under these quotas naturally re-
quire SPO approval to insure that the proposed investments are in conformity
with plan objectives. For investment goods imported under those quotas,
therefore, SPO has considerable influence over the direction of investment.8
The Import Program
As indicated at the outset, the stages discussed above take place simulta-
8. Many forms of machinery and equipment have individual quotas, so that the invest-
ment-goods quotas do not cover all investment goods. However, by the late 1960's
SPO had power to grant duty-exemptions and other incentives to capital-goods on-
ports when the purpose of the investment conformed with the Plan. Thus SPO could
effectively influence virtually all investments. See Appendix A for an estimate of the
value of the duty exemptions.r
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neously and considerable iteration is involved. The Import Program, when it
emerges, consists of: (1) regulations and procedures for applying for import Imp
licenses; (2) regulations surrounding the use of import licenses and the clear-
ing of goods through customs; (3) the Liberalized List (broken into two lists List
in recent years, with different guarantee deposit rates being the only distinc- Importer IndJ
tion between the two), including an enumeration of goods on the List, an
item-by-item specification of Ministerial permission requirements, if any, and Obtain
indication for each item whether there are restrictions on the source of for-
Ce
eign exchange to be used for financing imports; and (4) the Quota List,
indicating the value of licenses to be issued in each quota category, and its
breakdown into industrialists' and importers' shares.
Once the Import Program is issued, persons wishing to import Liberalized Receive
List goods can, after obtaining Ministerial approval where necessary, apply Allocation
to the Central Bank for an import license. Persons wishing to import a Quota
List item begin the process of obtaining an allocation, to be described below, bank with
We turn now to the procedures and regulations governing the two types of guarantee
imports. The functioning of the system, and the degree to which the Import deposit
Programs were realized, is then considered in Section IV.
III. Import procedures
Procedures for obtaining imports vary depending upon the list in which a
good is included, the restrictions upon importation indicated in the list, and
whether the would-be importer is in the public or private sector. This section
focuses upon the procedures for private sector firms. Generally speaking, or
public sector quota allocations are administered by the Ministry of Finance.
Public sector imports are not subject to guarantee deposit requirements ex- Advertise
cept for AID-fmariced imports, and private sector spokesmen claim that gen- in SBC
erally the SEEs have a far simpler time obtaining their imports than do
private sector firms.9 No hard evidence is available upon this point, however.
An effort was made to determine the fraction of all imports going to the
public sector, but available data were not sufficient to enable an estimate.
Procedures for Liberalized List items are generally far simpler than for Fig. 3
Quota List items, and are therefore considered first. Even at their simplest,
however, import procedures are complex. The accompanying chart summa-
rizes the procedures, and may be a useful reference throughout this section. The reader can refer to Ta
were in various categories.
9. In the Import Programs, special quotas are set aside for "Emergency Requirements of Procedures for obtaining i
SEEs" and "Emergency Requirements of Private Sector Enterprises." The SEE quotas
have generally been twice those of private sector firms despite the fact that the share
As indicated above so of each intotalproduction is about equaLThe Import Regime of the 1960's The Anatomy of the Regime in the 1960's 145
TheImport Program, when it
lures for applying for import Importer's Certificate Required
import licenses and the clear.
List (broken into two lists Quota List Liberalized List
t rates being the only distinc- Importer Industrialist Permission Certificate Required?
ion of goods on the List, an
;ion requirements, if any, and Obtain Requirement
rictionson the source of for- Certificate
rts; and (4) the Quota List, / Obr
tamletter of
credit each quota category, and its
res. Place guarantee
wishing to import Liberalized Receive __—dePosit,1,
where necessary, apply Allocation
ns wishing to import a Quota Apply at
letter of
credit
ation, to be described below, authorized
.J, bankwith governing the two types of guarantee
Apply to Central
Bank degree to which the Import deposit
Receive license
king upon the list in whicha
on indicated in the list, and
r private sector. This section Order
7
fIrms.Generally speaking, $5,000
or more y the Ministry of Finance.
'1' edeposit requirements ex- Advertise
spokesmen claim that gen- in SBC
g their imports than do Placeorder
e upon this point, however.
Goodsarrive f all imports going to the
to enable an estimate. Clear customs
erally far simpler than for
St. Even at their simplest, Fig. 3. Summary of import procedures.
companying chart surnrna-
e throughout this section. The reader can refer to Tables A-l 1 to A-14 to gain an idea of which goods
were in various categories.
"Emergency Requirementsof
Enterprises." The SEEquotas Procedures for obtaining imports under the Liberalized List
despite the fact that theshare
As indicated above, some items on the Liberalized List require Ministerial
EI
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approval prior to receipt of an import license. Others are eligible for importa-
tion only with AID funds. Special procedures are required for these goods.
We first discuss the license allocations for those Liberalized List items which
are not restricted in either way. Thereafter, the additional steps associated
with AID financing or Ministerial approval are reviewed.
Unrestricted Liberalized List goods.Generally speaking, anyone having
a "legitimate reason" to import a Liberalized List good can do so by follow-
ing the procedures outlined here. First, no one is eligible to receive an import
license unless he has an "Importer's Certificate." Such a Certificate is ob-
tained from the local Chamber relevant for the importer's purpose: manufac-
turing firms are licensed by the Chamber of Industries whereas wholesalers
are licensed by the Chamber of Commerce.'° The Chambers' purpose in
licensing is to establish that the applicant is a bona fide producer or whole-
saler. The Importer's Certificate does not entitle the holder to select any item
on the import list. Rather, it is restricted to the range of items relevant to the
holder's business. The holder with such a Certificate is eligible to apply for
any relevant item from any list.
Interviews with officials from the Chambers and with individual importers
yielded the impression that obtaining an Importer's Certificate is straightfor-
ward and entails neither high costs nor long delays. Once an individual or firm
holds such a Certificate, it is good for an indefinite period unless the holder is
found guilty of violation of any import regulations. Thus it is a once-and-for-
all procedure. However, the fact that Importer's Certificates are restricted to
a given class of commodities implies that an individual importer cannot shift
his imports around in response to demand shifts without an amendment to
his Certificate. Thus if the domestic price of a given commodity rises sharply
relative to landed cost, some wholesalers are ineligible to import it and may
continue importing lower-profit items to which they are entitled while having
their Certificates altered.
Once a new Import Program is announced, all individuals and firms hold-
ing Importer's Certificates valid for commodities on the Liberalized List can
make application at any time for an import license (permit) from the Central
Bank.'' The applicant must give the description of the goods he wishes to
import, the quantity of each item and the unit price. The applicant files his
application, along with a guarantee deposit made at the local bank and then
10. Manufacturers and others importing only for their own use can use alternate proce-
dures if they wish. In 1971 the Ministry of Commerce assumed responsibility for the
issuance of Importer's Certificates.
11. Recall that Ministerial approval requirements and AID-financed imports are not yet
being considered.
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transferred to the Central Bank. The guarantee deposit rates for various cate-
gories of goods and at various points in time are given in Table A-S. The
Central Bank then issues import permits in the amount applied for to the
applicants, on a first-come first-served basis as foreign exchange is available,
Generally speaking the fall and winter of each year are the peak export
months, with delays in issuing licenses consequently tending to be shorter
than during the late summer months. In addition to seasonal factors in export
earnings, the general stringency of the foreign-exchange market can influence
the delay encountered in receiving import permits. Thus in the early 1960's
delays tended to be fairly short, but their average duration increased as the
foreign-exchange situation became tighter.
It should be noted that despite the Annual Program figure for Liberalized
List imports, licenses are actually issued for Liberalized List imports as for-
eign exchange becomes available. Thus any errors in forecasting foreign-ex-
change availability are compensated for by lengthening or shortening the
delay in issuing an import license. Hence in the late 1960's when the excess
demand for licenses was increasing rapidly, firms wishing to import Liberal-
ized List goods made their applications early, and Liberalized List status did
not assure would-be importers that they could import these goods. Also, the
Central Bank generally refused to accept new applications in the last part of
an Import Program period to prevent speculation against the new import lists.
Once received, an import permit is valid for six months unless an addition-
al delay is required for manufacture to specifications, in which case it can be
extended. In principle, if the import permit is not used within six months it is
void, and 10 per cent of the initial guarantee deposit is forfeited. However,
government officials and businessmen alike claimed in interviews that renewal
of unused import permits was fairly automatic. Thus, at the cost of having
resources tied up in guarantee deposits, individuals could "speculate" against
the disappearance of a commodity from later Liberalized Lists. Some govern.
ment officials interviewed claimed that the practice of speculating in import
licenses, even if that speculation took place over a period of several years, was
commonplace.'2 Indeed, a license once issued constitutes a valid claim
against foreign exchange. Government officials complained that the practice
of speculative holding of import licenses made new regulations difficult to
enforce, particularly when a commodity was removed from the list of eligible
imports,
12, With the very high guarantee deposits in the latter part of the 1960's, it is difficult to
imagine that speculation was terribly great. However, it is conceivable that indi-
viduals held import permits from earlier periods, when guarantee deposits were con-
siderably lower. Of course individual speculators would stifi have incurred the risk
that the license would be invalidated, as per the law.148 The Import Regime of the 1960's
All Liberalized List imports must be financed under letters of credit. Esti-
mates of the cost of letters of credit have ranged from 1 .5 to 10 per cent of
the c.i.f. value of the goods. (It should be noted that these costs have not
been included in the EER calculations given below.) Once the import permit
and letter of credit are in hand, the importer can place his order. The last step
is clearing customs. In general, the customs' role is two-fold: (1) to ascertain
that the imported items conform in every respect to the description on the
import permit; and (2) to collect the duties and surcharges associated with
importation.
The process of checking that the goods conform with those described on
the import permit has been the subject of complaint at various periods. The
consignment was supposed to conform not only in physical description but
also in total volume and price to the amount on the import permit. Business.
men have cited in interviews instances where they had been able to obtain
orders more cheaply than anticipated. Such a discrepancy was as difficult to
clear as one in which the price had been underestimated. Of course one
obvious purpose of the customs check is to insure that goods on the prohib.
ited list are not imported clandestinely, either as unnecessary components of
larger Units, or in other disguised forms. Interviewees occasionally volunteered
that they had imported an item to obtain only one component which itself
was not legally importable. It is doubtful, however, whether such a practice
was widespread.
The collection of duties and surcharges is straightforward, as far as avail-
able information indicates. One point should be noted, however. Importing
was such a profitable activity that importers were frequently eligible for
favored interest rates from the banks and for special classes of credit.1 3The
availability of this credit ended at the point where goods cleared customs.
Thus it was not infrequent for an importer to keep his goods in customs for
considerable periods, since financing was provided through importers' credits.
Although the cost to the importer was sizeable, it was less so than holding the
goods, once through customs, since duties and surcharges raised the carrying
cost of the goods by a high percentage.
Thus licensing procedures are virtually automatic for Liberalized List im-
ports not subject to restriction. The chief difficulties have been with the high
guarantee deposit requirements, and with uncertainty about delays in issu-
ance of licenses. When adequate foreign exchange was available, goods on the
Liberalized List were generally importable without great difficulty or high
costs.
I
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Liberalized List imports subject to permission. When the approval of a
government agency is required prior to issuance of an import license, an
additional step is added to the licensing procedure. A "Permission Certifi-
cate" has to be obtained from the specified agency. Once such a Certificate is
obtained, the other formalities follow the same lines as an unrestricted Liber-
alized List commodity.
• Generally speaking, the intent of the Permission Certificate requirement is to
restrict imports. Delays in obtaining Permission Certificates can occasional-
• ly be considerable, sometimes spilling over into an Import Program where the
item is no longer eligible for importation. In most cases the effect of the
additional certificate requirement is simply to lengthen the delay prior to
obtaining a license. Sometimes would-be importers are told that the item they
seek is available domestically. In those instances it is incumbent upon the
applicant either to obtain letters from domestic producers stating they can
not provide the item to the right specifications, or to purchase from a domes-
tic source. Apparently the sort of difficulties associated with these stipula-
tions varies considerably from one manufacturing sector to the next.
AID-financed Liberalized List goods.Some Liberalized List goods were
• designated as "AID-only" and others as "partly-AID."" Liberalized List
items designated "AID-only" could be imported only with AID funds subject
to the restrictions on those funds. "Partly-AID" designations meant that the
item could be purchased from the United States with AID funds or from
other countries with free foreign exchange. Use of non-AID foreign exchange
to purchase goods from the United States under "partly-AID" designations
was not permitted.'Thus once a particular tranche of program aid was
exhausted, importers' applications for permits for AID-financed imports were
delayed until new AID funds became available. On rare occasions importers
could file a new application designating an alternative source of supply, and
receive their import license sooner than by awaiting approval of their AID-
financed import application.'6
AID-financed imports were subject to special formalities. First, U.S. Gov-
ernment regulations were that the minimum size shipment under AID financ.
14. The procedure changed late in the 1960's as program aid became relatively less
important and as dollars received under AID were utilized early in the Import Pro-
gram periods. For most of the 1960's AID-designations were an important part of
the system. The episode provides an amusing instance of aid-tying resulting in
smaller exports from the aid donor than would otheTwise have occurred.
15. In principle, the Ministry of Finance could make special exemption in the case of
emergency requirements. That seldom happened, however. It was the United States
that requested that the AID-designations be removed.
16. LubelletaL, op. cit. (Note 7), p. 84.150 The Import Regime of the 1960's The Anatomy of the Regime in th
ing was $5,000.1 7Thusa firm requiring spare parts or other items in smaller
value was forced to stockpile the additional amount, to pool the order with
another firm's, or to order from an alternative source of supply where there
was no such requirement. Second, because the U.S. imposed certain require-
ments on AIDImanced imports, customs checks were undertaken in greater
detail than for non-AID financed goods. Third —theformality about which
there was most complaint —theU.S. required that prospective importers
advertise in the Small Business Circular (SBC) of the AID Office of Small
Business. Advertising had to commence at least 45 days prior to the placing
of an order. Importers were required under Turkish regulations to submit
their specifications in English for transmittal to the SBC within twenty-five
days after receipt of their import permit but not before. Thus the SBC-
advertising requirement added at least a month and a half to the delay in
obtaining imports.'8
Procedures for Quota List items
The procedure for individual quota allocations is much more complex than
the Liberalized List procedure. As with Liberalized List imports, an Import-
er's Certificate or other proof of a valid business interest is required, and once
a permit is obtained the customs procedures are the same as for Liberalized
List items. In between, the procedure differs considerably.
Potential importers must obtain a quota allocation before applying for an
import license. As indicated above, potential importers indicate their prospec-
tive needs to their local Chamber of Commerce or Industry. The local Cham-
ber representatives then meet under the auspices of the Union of Chambers.
The conflict between importers and industrialists is resolved at that stage.
Then regional claims are disentangled at the Union of Chambers level. The
Union of Chambers represents the private sector in the negotiations for the
determination of quotas. Once the quota listispublished, firms apply
through their Chamber for allocations. After receiving allocations, import
license applications are submitted and the Central Bank issues licenses fairly
automatically.
17. $5,000 became the minimum in 1965. Prior to that date it had been $1,000.
18. The requirement was most onerous on the private sector, since SEEs were not
subject to guarantee deposit requirements. Even for the private sector, there were
some ways of avoiding SBC advertising: having sole supplier status, exclusive repre-
sentative status, buying from U.S. stockpiles, etc. A U.S. Government study drew a
sample of firms actually winning bids from SBC advertising. Firms in the sample
included IBM, General Electric, International Harvester, Dow Chemical, B.F. Good.
rich, and General Motors. See Lubell et at., op. cit. (Note 7), p. 89.
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Importers versus industrialists.As already mentioned, the Union of
Chambers is an association of all the regional Chambers of Commerce and
Industry. The regional Chambers are in turn subdivided into Chambers of
Commerce and Chambers of Industry. Both are further subdivided into func-
tional groups —tiremanufacturers, for example, are called together under the
auspices of the Chamber of Industry to provide estimates of their import
needs. Similarly, an importers' group meets to estimate its demands for im-
ported tires of types not domestically produced. The obvious potential for
conflict between importers and industrialists has been fully realized: so much
so, in fact, that what used to be a Chamber of Commerce and Industry has
become two Chambers. The importers are of course interested in increasing
the flow of resaleable goods into the country, in receiving foreign-exchange
allocations themselves and in keeping finished goods on the list of eligible
imports. Industrialists are by contrast interested in their own quotas of inter-
mediate goods and raw materials and in reducing the importers' quotas to
limit competition with their products.
The importers as a group lost out to the industrialists in the 1960's. This
can be seen in Table VI-l, which gives the value of industrialists' and import-
ers' quotas for various Import Programs. The user-specific quotas are not
included; their inclusion would make the figures show even more vividly the
increasing preponderance of the industrialists in the import license alloca-
tions. Thus in 1962 importers were allocated 48 per cent of the quota items;
by 1970 they received only 23 per cent, and their total allocation had de-
clined by 43 per cent.
Table VI-1
Importers' and industrialists' allocations, various Import Programs (thousands of dollars)
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Total 29,545 26,198 32,655 33,641 35,181
Percent to importers48 39 35 30 23
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Notes:a) Merino wool was included in the 16th and 20th Quota Lists, with quotas to
industrialists of $12 million and $13.5 million. To maintain comparability over
the period, merino wool was excluded from the sum of the industrialists' quotas.
b) Legally, PL 480 imports are an importers' allocation, but they are not
treated in the same manner. Hence they are not included in the totals.
Sources: Import ProgramsNos. 8, 12, 16, 20 and 24 (see Note 3).152 The Import Regime of the 1960's
Allocation of quotas after publication of lists. Industrialists.As mdi.
cated above, the public and private sector shares of individual quotas are
worked out by the Ministries of Commerce, Industry and Finance and the
Union of Chambers. When quotas are announced, some items are designated
as being subject to the control of individual ministries. Industrialists apply for
those items to the relevant ministry for a "Requirements Certificate." When
no Ministry is specified, they apply to the local Chamber of Industry, which
forwards the applications to the Union of Chambers.
The Chambers and practically all ministries base the allocation among
industrialists according to the plant capacities of the applicants.'Require-
ments Certificates are issued in proportion to those capacities unless the
value of all applications totals less than the quota, in which case applicants
receive the amount requested. The amount allocated to each industrialist is
shown on the Requirements Certificate which, when forwarded to the Central
Bank (with guarantee deposit), is the basis upon which the import license is
issued.
In contrast to Liberalized List goods, the Central Bank issues licenses
against quota items fairly rapidly, as foreign exchange is budgeted for the
purpose. Applications for licenses for Quota List imports can be made only
once in each import period, contrasted with Liberalized List imports, for
which application can in principle be made at any time and repeatedly if
desired.
Allocation of quotas: Importers.Once the import lists are published
importers are given a month within which to fIle their requests for licenses
(and a guarantee deposit) with an authorized bank. No application may ex-
ceed 20 per cent of the amount of a quota unless 20 per cent does not cover
even one unit of the item subject to allocation.
The authorized banks forward the importers' applications to the Central
Bank, which sums the value of requests by quota category. Should the sum of
the value of imports requested from a given quota category fall short of the
amount of the quota, each applicant is given an import permit for the amount
he requested. In theory, when the sum of the value of the applications in a
given category exceeds the quota amount, the Central Bank grants all applica-
tions by scaling them down proportionately so that the quota is exactly
filled. Provisions are available for circumstances in which pro-rata rationing
results in applicants receiving a license for less than the cost of a single unit of
the commodity. If such licenses cover more than 50 per cent of the price,
each recipient receives an incremental allotment sufficient to cover the pur-
chase of one unit.
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Bilateral agreement quotas.The items eligible for importation under
Bilateral Agreements must be included on either the Liberalized List or the
Quota List. Determination as to which items should be on the Bilateral List is
made entirely on the basis of the goods available in the bilateral agreement
countries. Generally speaking, it was and is considerably easier and quicker to
obtain a Bilateral Agreement quota license than any other import permit.
Importers who were interviewed claimed that the chief advantage of the
Bilateral Agreement quotas was the ease with which licenses could be ob-
tained, and hence that when a commodity was required quickly the Bilateral
Agreement list was employed if possible.
Price checks
The applicant is required to indicate in each import-license application the
nature of the commodity he wishes to import, its f.o.b. price and its c.i.f.
price per unit. Each Import Program has contained a provision to the effect
that "Imports will be made at the most suitable prices obtainable in the world
markets."2° In principle, imports were subject to ex-post price checks to
insure that overinvoicing of imports did not occur. The price checks during
the 1950's had, as seen in Chapter II, been vigorously carried out. By the
1960's, however, it was rare that individuals were investigated post-importa-
tion. When the government changed in 1971 it was widely believed that there
had been overinvoicing during the 19 60's and price checks were enforced
with greater vigor than before. (See Section IV, below, for estimates of the
evasion of the regime.)
IV. The functioning of the import regime
Given the intent with which Import Programs were formulated, itis of
interest to consider how the system actually worked. Several questions are
• significant: (1) How close were actual imports to Import Program figures? (2)
How did the composition of the lists change over time? (3) How did applica-
tions for import licenses under quotas compare with the quota values? (4) To
what extent was the system evaded through over and underinvoicing and
other phenomena? Finally, (5) what sorts of import EERs and premia on
• licenses resulted from the system? Each of these questions wifi be considered
in turn.154 TheImport Regime of the 1960's The Anatomy of the Regime in
Actual and program imports
Table VI-2 shows the planned composition of imports from 1964 to 1970.
_____
Ascan be seen, imports categorized as "investment goods" were approximate-
ly evenly split between the Liberalized List and the Quota List. The heavy
dependence upon anticipated foreign aid can be seen in the large volume of
investment—goods imports planned under the "self-financed" category, in
which project aid was expected to constitute the largest CompOnent.2' About
two-thirds of raw materials imports were planned to originate from the Liber-
alized List and one-third from the Quota List. However, imports of crude
petroleum, the largest single import category, were included in the Liberal-
ized List, thus making the comparison for other products deceptive. As can
be seen, the Programs allowed for virtually no increase in consumption-goods
imports in the early years, and an absolute decrease after 1968. The consump-
tion-goods totals conceal the fact that an increasing number of "non-essen-
tial" consumer goods were dropped from the import lists, while the size of
the Liberalized List allocation for consumer goods reflects the growth of
those consumer-goods imports deemed vital to health and education. Of
course reduced utilization of PL 480 funds also cut the anticipated total of
consumer-goods imports. 1967
Unfortunately, no data classified by end-use are available on the actual
composition of imports within each import list.22 Table VI-3 gives the com-
parison of actual and programmed totals by list and by end-use.
The biggest single disparity between Import Programs and realized imports
was in the "self-financed" category prior to 1969 (as reflected in the "other"
column of Table VI-3).Thedisparity between planned and actual figures
reflects the shortfall of project credits. Actual quota imports were very close
to Plan levels in every year, as were Liberalized List imports.
The composition of imports by end-use was generally different from that
planned, as was noted in Chapter V. In every year except 1967 imports
classified as investment goods fell below planned levels, generally by substan-
tial amounts. In large part, this once more reflected the lower-than-planned
21. These "self-financed" imports constitute the major part of the column headed
"Other" in Table Vl-3.
22. The SPO estimated the percentage of Liberalized List imports in each end-use cate-
gory for 1961, 1964 and 1966. There were no projections of end-use for 1961. For
1964 and 1966, the actual percentage of imports in each category (with projections
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Table VI-2
Annual program imports, 1964 to 1970 (millions of dollars)
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Investment goods 55 55 25 145 280
Raw materials 168 64 28 20 280
Consumption goods 17 16 12 35 80
Total 240 135 65 200 640
1965
investment goods 65 72 30 127 294
Raw materials 158 79 25 29 291
Consumption goods 17 18 15 30 80
Total 40 169 70 186 665
1966
Investmentgoods 78 105 27 110 320
Raw materials 157 108 40 20 325
Consumption goods 25 12 13 30 80
Total 260 225 80 160 725
1967
Investment goods 100 105 15 120 340
Raw materials 215 100 60 0 375
Consumption goods 25 35 15 10 85
Total 340 240 90 130 800
1968
Investment goods 100 95 17 120 332
Raw materials 235 120 63 0 418
Consumption goods 25 25 20 15 85
Total 360 240 100 135 835
1969
Investment goods 80 100 35 150 365
Raw materials 260 120 60 0 440
Consumption goods 15 15 10 15 55
Total 355 235 105 165 860
1970
Investment goods 110 91 20 154 375
Raw materials 270 110 70 0 450
Consumption goods 20 4 15 16 55
Total 400 205 105 170 880
Note:Planned figures given here do not agree with those in Table V-2. The plan
figures in Table V-2 were taken from the Plans, whereas data in this table are
from the Annual Programs.
Source:Annual Programs, State Planning Organization, various years.
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Note:The 1968-to-1970 figure is given in the 1971 Annual Program. 1969 data, in
the 1970 Program, covered January—June only. Therefore, only the three-year
total is available.
Source:Annual Programs: same year for planned imports; subsequent year for actual
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by end—use (millions of dollars) Table V1-4
Transition matrices, 100-commodity samples
From:
1. Third to sixteenth import list
Sample 1 Sample 2
L Q P T L Q P T
Sample 3
L Q P T
To: L 16 12 0 28 14 13 7 34 15 7 12 34
Q 4 46 0 50 4 32 15 51 3 24 9 36
P 2 20 0 22 1 5 9 15 0 6 24 30
1 22 78 0100 19 50 31100 18 37 45100
2. Sixteenth to twenty-fourth import list
From:
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
L Q P T L Q P T L Q P T
To: L 22 7 1 30 28 5 1 34 30 0 8 38
Q 4 39 3 46 3 36 4 43 4 34 12 50
P 2 4 18 24 3 10 10 23 0 2 10 12
12850 22100 34 51 15100 34 36 30100
level of project credits which were expected to finance investment-goods
imports.
Throughout the 1960's raw materials imports (including intermediate
goods) were consistently underestimated. It was projected in the FFYP that
raw materials imports would be $1,485 million over the five years, constitut-
ing 44 per cent of total imports. As experience demonstrated that these
figures were underestimates of the raw materials component of the lists, the
Annual Programs revised the raw materials import projections upward and the
investment-goods import projections downward. Thus the sum of the Annual
Program raw materials estimates was $1,506 million. Despite that upward
adjustment, actual raw materials imports were $1,681 million or 13 per cent
greater than envisaged in the FFYP, and constituted 51 per cent of total
imports during the Plan period.158 ThelrnportRegimeofthel96O's
Thus programmed imports by list were generally quite close to actual
imports, save for imports financed by project credits. By end-use categories,
however, raw material imports were considerably larger and investment'goods
imports smaller than had been planned.
Another feature of the outcome should be noted. The fact that Liberalized
List imports came as close to program levels as they did does not reflect the
accuracy of the planners' demand projections, since import licenses for Liber-
alized List imports were granted only as foreign exchange became available.
Given that licenses under the Quota List were granted fairly rapidly, the value
of Liberalized List licenses issued was in fact the residual in terms of Central
Bank behavior. Insofar as estimates of available foreign exchange were accu-
rate, the value of Liberalized List imports projected in the Import Programs
was realized, as acceleration or delay in the issuance of licenses kept total
Liberalized List imports at planned levels.
As foreign-exchange stringency developed in the mid-1960's several factors
reduced the degree of freedom associated with Liberalized List imports. It
became standard practice to cease processing import license applications for
Liberalized List goods prior to the end of the program period. The motive for
the cessation was generally "to avoid speculation about the next Import
Program." Second, when foreign exchange was in short supply, license appli-
cations for Liberalized List imports were held until such time as foreign
exchange became available, when they were treated on a first-come, first-
served basis. Thus prior to devaluation in 1970 import licenses for Liberalized
List goods were issued eight months after application. As these delays devel-
oped it was evident that the freedom which the Liberalized List was designed
to provide had severe restrictions surrounding it.
In addition to delays in and cessation of licensing, other restrictions began
to pervade Liberalized List imports. The ministerial permission requirements
have already been mentioned. Guarantee deposit requirements against appli-
cations for Liberalized List imports were generally higher than those for
Quota List imports. Moreover, many items on the Liberalized List could be
imported only with AID funds, and hence only from the United States.
Particularly given the high minimum import order under AID funds (not to
mention advertising in the Small Business Circular and other administrative
delays), the restriction against use of free foreign exchange for some Liberal-
ized List imports caused difficulties in many instances.
In interviews with producers using imported intermediate goods, one ques-
tion that was asked was whether the producers preferred that their imports be
on the Liberalized List or the Quota List. In 1965 most responders indicated
relative indifference, claiming there were advantages and disadvantages to
each. By 1969 however most expressed the view that Quota List classification
was preferable since one could then be more or less assured that foreign
T
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Corn position of the lists
Given the growth of the Turkish economy and the altered structure of its
imports, due both to structural changes and to the import control system, no
general description in terms of the value of imports on each list or by end-use
can accurately convey the evolution of the import regime under the import
lists. Indeed, the commodity-specific nature of the lists make such a macro-
view deceptive.
In an effort to characterize the microeconomic aspects of the import
control system it was decided to trace the fate of samples of individual
commodities. In this section, a report is given on the results from the 1960 to
the 1971 import lists.
It was initially decided to choose three samples of commodities, one from
an early import list, one from a middle import list, and one from a recent list,
and to examine their treatment over time. The choice of three time periods
seemed necessary because use of an early list would fail to reflect commodi-
ties entering the lists at later dates; use of a later list would ignore commodi-
ties which had been dropped from earlier lists. Perhaps the best description of
the degree of complexity of the lists and their evolution is the difficulty
encountered in attempting to formulate and characterize the sample.23 The
efforts made in that direction and such results as can be gleaned from them
are reported in the first part of this section. In the second part a smaller
sample of commodities, taken from tariff schedules, is discussed.
Three one-hundred commodity samples.The three Import Programs
from which samples were drawn were the Third (August 1959), Twelfth
(January 1964), and Twenth-sixth (January 1971). Determination of the
items to be included was done by random number drawings: the first deter-
mined the page, the second the location of the commodity on that page.
Once the sample items were determined, it was planned to go over the lists
for Import Programs 1 through 5, 12, 16, 22,24 and 26. It was expected that
on the basis of the samples one could characterize the evolution of the
system: the number of items which moved from the Liberalized List to the
Quota List, the number from either list to the "Prohibited List," and the
values of permissible imports of quota items at various dates.
The task was considerably more complex than had been anticipated. Mean-
23. I am heavily indebted to Ashok Kapoor, who spent many thankless hours trying to
make sense out of a difficult assignment.160 The Import Regime of the 1960's
ingfully tracing the fate of any import-good category proved difficult, and
characterizing the results for each 100-commodity sample grossly oversimpli-
fies what actually happened.
Some examples will illustrate. The third item drawn in the first sample,
Quota Number 197, "Miners' Lamps," combined B1'Ncodes83.07 and
85.10. In the Third Import Program, $5,000 was allocated to importers'
quotas from free foreign exchange, and $5,000 from bilateral agreement
countries' quotas. Over the next several Programs this same item was on the
Liberalized List. In the Twelfth Import Program however 83.07 disappeared
from the import list while 85.10, "Miners' Lamps and Parts Thereof," was on
the Liberalized List. In the Sixteenth Import Program, 85.11 was Quota
No. 307, allotting $20,000 to industrialists and $10,000 to importers for the
category "Electric Lamps for use in Industrial Establishments and Laborato-
ries," while 85.10, "Miners' Lamps", was on the Liberalized List. Item 85.11
was omitted from all lists thereafter, implying that imports were now prohib-
ited, while item 85.10 was on the Liberalized List. Many of the commodities
drawn in the sample presented difficulties of a comparable nature in terms of
classification.
An even more serious problem arose with items such as the fourteenth
category drawn in the first sample. That item, BTN code 48.08, was "Paper
for Filter Appliances." A total quota allocation of $450,000 was split be-
tween importers and industrialists, while another $50,000 was at the disposal
of a ministry. In the Fourth and Fifth Programs, 48.08 was lumped with
several other commodities to form one quota number. By the Twelfth Import
Program, 48.08 had its own quota (112) again. By the Twentieth Import
Program, however, Quota Number 163 contained 48.08.10 and 48.08.90,
"Paper Pulp Filter —MassPlates Containing Asbestos Fibers" and "Other,"
with an allocation to importers of $5,000. No other part of 48.08 appeared
on any list. In this and many other cases part of the quota item initially
indicated became ineligible for importation, whereas part of the item re-
mained eligible. In some instances the situation was further confounded as an
initial four-digit code became subclassified into several six-digit codes, each of
which was grouped with commodities from other four-digit codes to form a
new quota number. An additional difficulty resulted from the following prac-
tice: in drawing commodities from the second and third sample it often
happened that no comparable commodity had appeared on earlier lists. This
resulted from: (1) the introduction of new intermediate goods to the lists as the
items for which domestic productive capacity developed increased, and (2) the
use of detailed itemized subcategories, crossing over four-digit classifications in
later Programs with no comparable practice in the earlier ones.
Thus in the following characterization of the three samples it must be
borne in mind that a considerable element of judgment had to enter into each
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categorization. Any characterization of the samples, moreover, vastly oversirn-
plifies what really happened.
Table VI-4 presents transition matrices for each of the three samples. Part
1 gives the change in status for each commodity in each sample between the
third (pre-planning) and sixteenth (early planning) import list. Of the 78 items
from the Quota List chosen in thefirst sample (third import list), at
least some parts of 46 of the commodity classifications were stili on a Quota
List in the Sixteenth Import Program. Obviously, since the sample was drawn
from the third list, no items on the "Prohibited List" were chosen, which
explains the zeros in the last column of the sample 1 figures. Twenty-two of
the 100 items appearing on the third import list did not appear on any list by
the Sixteenth Import Program. Twelve items which were quota items in the
third list were on the Liberalized List in the Sixteenth Program. The results
differ somewhat for the second sample, drawn from the Twelfth (1964)
Import Program. Thirty-one of the items from the Twelfth Program had not
appeared in the Third Program, and nine did not appear in the Sixteenth. The
fact that an item appeared on the Twelfth Program and neither on the Third
nor the Sixteenth indicates that there were some items on each import list
which did not recur or recurred only infrequently.
Only 15 items from sample 2 were on the "Prohibited List" in the Sixteenth
Program, contrasted with 22 from the first, reflecting the fact that the second
sample was chosen for a date which was much closer to the Sixteenth
Program. That is, many items from the Third Program which were dropped
from an import list were dropped before the Twelfth Program; thus, choosing
a sample from the Twelfth Program failed to pick up those items. The third
sample was chosen from the 1971 import list which, post-devaluation, was
somewhat more liberal than earlier lists had been. That factor, plus the
continuing addition of intermediate goods to the import lists as domestic
production required new goods, combined with the fact that 1971 categories
were of much more detailed nature, explains why there were 45 items on the
twenty-sixth import list which did not appear on the third.
Part 2 of Table V14 gives similar data for the fate of commodities in the
three samples between the sixteenth and twenty-fourth import lists. The
increased importance of the diagonal elements reflects the greater fluctua-
tions in the treatment of commodities in the early days of planning. By the
late 1960's changes between import lists tended to be somewhat smaller.
Thus between the third and sixteenth import lists, 12, 13, and 7 items,
respectively, subject to quota in the three samples were transferred to the
Liberalized List, whereas between the Sixteenth and Twenty-fourth Pro-
grams, 7, 5,and0 items, respectively, were so transferred. Similarly, most of
the items from the first sample which were destined for the "Prohibited List"
reached it by the Sixteenth Program; only 6 new items were added to the"Prohibited List" from the first sample between the Sixteenth and Twenty.
fourth Programs.
The transition matrices fail fully to reflect the extent of the increasing use
of the "Prohibited List": (1) since all three samples were drawn from import
lists, any item continuously prohibited could not be drawn (but see below,
where a sample is taken from the Tariff Code); and (2) for many of the items
which continued on the lists, only a subcategory of the original classification
was eligible for importation in later Programs.
Some evidence of this can be gleaned from classification of the commodi-
ties in each sample. Five categories reflect, at least roughly, increasing speci-
ficity of an eligible import class. They are, in order of increased restrictive.
ness: a four-digit category; a six-digit category; a four.digit category contain-
ing an "only" or a "for use only by"; a six-digit category containing one of
the same restrictions; and a "for use only.subject to ministerial permission"
category. The "use-only" categories are by items such as "Rollers for Textile
Machines Only." Examples of the "only" part of a classification were cited
above.




34 51 3 11 1
23 38 11 21 7
8 48 16 9 19
As can be seen, only one item chosen from the Third Import Program was in
the most restricted category, and 85 per cent of all items were in the fIrst
two, least restrictive, categories. By the Twelfth Program seven items were in
the most restricted category, and 61 per cent were in the least restricted
groups. By 1971, the Twenty-sixth Program, 19 items were in the use/permis-
sion category, and only 56 per cent were in the least restrictive categories.
The "use" categories of course reflect the increasing shift of the Import
Programs to heavier and heavier emphasis upon intermediate and other pro-
ducers' goods.
When the samples were initially drawn it was hoped to trace the value of
eligible imports over subsequent Programs to gain some idea of the increasing
restrictiveness of the regime. Thus it was hoped that one could estimate the
value of the 100 items included in the fIrst sample in 1959 and over subse-
quent Programs. This proved to be impossible because of the detailed nature
of the commodities included in the lists and an inability of find a comparable
classification in actual import statistics. All that could be done was to esti-
mate by sample the value of import quotas for those goods that remained in
162 The Import Regime of the 1960's The Anatomy of the Regime inth4
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quota categories over various periods. As can be seen from the transition
matrices this computation covered 46 per cent of the first sample for the
period 1959 to 1966 and 39 per cent of the sample for 1966 to 1969. The
coverage was even smaller in the second (32 and 36 per cent) and third (24
and 34 per cent) samples. Nonetheless, in the absence of any better indicator
the value of quotas for those items which remained on Quota Lists is of some
interest. Table VI-5 gives the results of the computations. As can be seen, the
value of permissible imports for quota items fell sharply between the Third
and Sixteenth Programs, and declined a further 50 per cent between the
Sixteenth and Twenty-fourth Programs if judged by the first sample. Of
course items subject to quota at an initial but not as a terminal date are
excluded from the sample, so that the value of the quotas in the Sixteenth
Import Program contrasted to the Third is not the same as that of the
Sixteenth contrasted with the Twenty-fourth. Of Items worth $5,905,000 in
the Sixteenth Import Program Quota Lists, products worth $240,000 were
ineligible for importation or were on the Liberalized List in 1969. The fact
that a few items did shift from the Quota List to the Liberalized List makes it
impossible to infer the total change in values of quotas, although itis
probably reasonable to guess that the "Prohibited List" dominated.
The narrowing of eligible import categories is clearly reflected in the sharp
reduction in values of permissible imports, especially between the Third and
Sixteenth Programs. As already pointed out, new items were added to the
later import lists. It is evident therefore that given the slow growth of total
imports over the period, sizeable shrinkage in other import categories had to
occur to finance the addition of new import categories.
A sample from tariff categories.To supplement the information from
the import list samples (as well as to estimate EERs), a sample of commodi-164
tieswas chosen from the Tariff Schedules. Details on the means of sample
selection are given in Appendix A, while Tables A-il to A-14 detail some of
the results.
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a P-prefix in the Appendix tables), the ambiguity of some categories, the fact
that some items were split between two lists, etc. The reader can see the mass
of different categories by inspection of the Appendix Tables.
Table VI-6 summarizes the data for 1962,1965 and 1968. The gradual shift
toward Quota Lists (as domestic production began) and the "Prohibited
List" (as domestic production was deemed adequate to meet domestic de-
mand) is evident. The intermediate goods which were eliminated from the
eligible import lists were generally already fabricated in Turkey. Part of the
shift toward the "Prohibited List" is obscured by the behavior of the capital
goods category, where more commodities were made eligible for importation
in later years (with appropriate ministerial approvals of investment plans). Six
of the capital goods were not on an import list in 1962 whereas only three
were missing by 1968. Of a total of 97 commodities in other categories, 40
were prohibited in 1962, 42 prohibited in 1965, and 47 prohibited in 1968.
Thus as expected, the "Prohibited List" appears more important in a
sample drawn from tariff classifications than in a sample drawn from import
lists. Moreover, the shift in eligible imports away from finished consumer
goods toward raw materials, intermediate goods and capital goods is apparent.
The results of the mechanism and its effects on the economy are examined in
Chapters VIII and IX below.
Detailed allocations under Quota Lists
As seen above, the amount allocated to each quota item was specifically
determined in the Import Programs. A natural question is the degree to which
these amounts were adjusted to reflect the relative strength of excess demand
for different imports. But little information on the procedures followed in
allocating values to individual quotas is available. Some things can be inferred
however by inspection of the value of applications for each quota number
relative to the value of the quota.
Several Union of Chambers publications provide some data, although they
are far from complete. Reports are available only for the Eighth Import
Program (1962),24 the Eighteenth Import Program (1967),2the Twenty-
first Import Program (1968),2 6andthe Twenty-third Program (1969).2 'The
24. Turkiye Ticaret Odalari, Sanayt Odalari ye Ticaret Borsalan Birligi, 8. Kota Sanayici
Tahsislerinin Tevziati (Ankara) Mart 1962.
25. TUrkiye Ticaret Odalari, Sanayi Odalan ye Ticaret Borsalari Birligi, XVII!. Kota
Sanayici Kotalari Tevziati Durumu (mimeograph) Mayis 1967.
26. Türkiye Ticaret Odalan, Sanayi Odalari ye Ticaret Borsalan Birligi, XXI. Kota
SanayiciKotalari TevziatiDurumu (mimeograph) Ekim 1968.
27. Türkye Ticaret Odalari, Sanayi Odalari ye Ticaret Borsalari XXIII. Kota
Sanayici Kotalari TevziatiDunimu (mimeograph) Ocak 1970.The Anatomy of the Regime in
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reports are on private sector allocations and cover only those quotas allocated
by the Union of Chambers at the time the report was published.
Several interesting sidelights can be gleaned from the 1962 report, which is
the only one containing a text explaining some aspects of the allocations. It
was stated, for example, that there were six quota groups for which alloca-
tions could not be made, since additional information was required about the
"needs and capacities" of industrialist applicants. All but one of these was an
assembler's quota, the other being a quota for animal fats and oils for use in
edible oils factories. Of the 155 quotas listed, allocations had been made for
139. A variety of reasons had prevented determination of allocations for the
remainder. In one case (quota 114) the allocation was under the control of
the Ministry of Industry. In another case (quota 141) it was stated that
allocations had not yet been made pending reexamination of applications. In
yet other cases the size of the applications exceeded the available quota by
exorbitant amounts and it was stated that the situation had to be examined
and studied before an allocation could be made. Thus against a private sector
quota of $25,000 for pumps, applications had amounted to $163,671; for
machine tools (quota 184) applications were for $380,000, contrasted with a
$75,000 allocation to the private sector. It can be seen in Table VI-7 that
Table VI-7
Ratio of value of license applications to licenses issued by quota categories 1962, 1967,
1968, 1970 (number of quota categories)
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suchdiscrepancies became commonplace later in the 1960's, butthey were
apparently rare in 1962.
Although providing only a partial picture of excess demands,the reports
give some indication of the characteristics of the system.Table VI-7 gives the
data. For each of the Import Programs covered and foreach of the quota
items, the value of applications by the private sector as amultiple of the value
of licenses allocated to it was computed. Such a statistic does notgive an
indication of actual excess demand since firms undoubtedlyapplied for more
imports than they actually desired. However, applicants wererequired to
place guarantee deposits against their applications. As such,applying for
quotas did involve costs to the applicants.
Table VI-7 can be read as follows. In 1962 sixteen quotasof $25,000 or
less were allocated where applications werebetween two and four times the
value of the quotas. Only one small quota (under $25,000) wasoversub-
scribed by a factor of ten or more, while none of the larger quotas were
oversubscribed by that amount; there were ten quota numbers againstwhich
no applications were filed. There were 30others for which applications were
less than the value of the quota, thus indicating that applicantsreceived the
full amount of their applications.
Several aspects of the evolution of the import regime can beinferred from
Table VI-7. First, despite the increasing reliance uponministerial permissions,
the number of quotas, and especially of small quotas,increased over im28
Second, the fraction of small and large quotas that wereheavily oversub-
scribed increased over time, reflecting the increasing stringencyof the import
___________________
regime.Thus in 1962 only one of 139 quota items was oversubscribedby a
factor of ten or more. By 1970 (predevaluation) 65 quotas outof 196 were
oversubscribed by at least that multiple. At the other end of the scale, 52 per
cent of all quotas were either undersubscribed oroversubscribed by a factor
of less than two in 1962: by 1970 only 19 per cent were in that category.
28. The increasing number of quotas reflected the greaterfragmentation of importable
items as domestic production capacity wasdeveloped. The number of quota cate-
gories, by Import Programs, was as follows:
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Third, even with heavy excess demand for many quotas in the later part of
the 1960's, there were some undersubscribed quotas. It thus seems irrefutable
that premia on different quota items must have varied widely (see Section V,
below). Thus in 1970 applicants for three quota items received the full
amount they applied for, while applicants for 38 items received less than
one-twentieth of their applications.
In interviews with SPO officials, inquiry was made as to whether informa-
tion about the value of excess demand in any given category or the disparity
between landed cost and domestic price of an import was employed in deter-
mining detailed quota allocations. The response was negative: it was felt that
"speculative and other short-term influences" were too great to provide relia-
ble bases for changing the relative size of different quotas. As indicated
above, the general view was that physical shortages became known when
present and were taken into account in the allocation of quotas for subse-
quent periods.
Evasion of the regime
No analysis of the way the import regime functioned would be complete
without consideration of the extent to which extra-legal and illegal means of
subventing the Import Programs were practiced. Three factors must be con-
sidered: (1) the degree to which resale of imports actually occurred; (2) the
extent of faked invoicing; and (3) the prevalence of smuggling.
Resale of imports.As indicated above, industrialists could not legally
resell their imports. However, there were several means by which resale oc-
curred. Indeed, since new firms in an industry were to be given a quota
initially on criteria rather different from established producers, there were
reported to be many instances of entrepreneurs "going into business" for the
purpose of obtaining imports and reselling to larger firms. Even some small
established firms found it more profitable to sell their imports at an appro-
priate price to larger firms rather than to produce themselves.
One perfectly legal means of resale was for a small producer to ask a large
producer to place his order together with the larger establishment's. The
purpose of permitting this practice was to enable the small producer to get a
better price on his import order than was thought possible with a very small
allocation. A producer with a small quota would approach a larger firm,
asking that his small quota be pooled with the larger quota for purposes of
importing the item in question. The larger firm would readily agree. When the
consignment arrived, the small firm could claim that the larger house had
violated their understanding; the consignment was not what the small firm
required or could use regarding quality, technical specifications, or other
•1
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be settled in court. The larger firm, seemingly anxious to repair whatever
damages it had incurred, would then settle the matter by paying the importer
the value of his foregone income from the imports and retain the imported
goods for his own use.
Other means of resale were also devised. (There are even reported instances
where the local Chambers organized resale markets.29) Thus although there
was a legal restriction upon the resale of industrialists' quotas, resale was in
fact fairly frequent.
Faked invoicing.All applications for import licenses had to contain de-
scriptions of the goods to be imported, the quantities of each and their unit
prices. It has already been seen that although price checks were legally in
force they were not seriously enforced during the 1960's. There is consider-
able evidence that substantial under-invoicing of imports in fact occurred, as
import licenses were issued in value terms so that more could be imported
and both duties and surcharges avoided.
A detailed study of the phenomenon during the period 1963 to 1969 has
been made by Cahid Kayra.3° Kayra undertook a detailed reconciliation of
Turkish and partner-country trade statistics, including adjustments for trans-
port costs, differences in the timing of imports and other factors. On the basis
of his detailed computations he then provided estimates of the actual value of
imports flowing through official channels. Some of his detailed findings are of
interest and illustrate the possible magnitude of faked invoicing.
Synthetic fibers are a case in point and Table VI-8 presents Kayra's results.
For each five-digit fiber class, Kayra summed the exports to Turkey, as
reported by members of the Common Market, and contrasted them with the
Turkish records. As can be seen, the discrepancy is substantial: suggesting
that less than 10 per cent of the value of Turkish imports of these items was
officially recorded in the customs category. Kayra calculated the savings in
customs duties made by such under-invoicing. His results are given in the last
column of Table VI-8. Thus, in importing $3,500,000 of SITC No. 266.21
(discontinuous or unspun fiber) in 1968, Turkish importers saved $1,544,000
in customs duties by declaring only $412,000 as imports. Kayra then pro-
ceeded to examine unit value figures for these countries. The unit value
derived from Turkish trade statistics was $681 in 1968 compared with $1,025
for Germany, $1,403 for Greece, and $1,278 for Spain. In 1969 the disparity
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Table Vl.8



































Source: Kayra, op. cit. (Note 30), Table 30.
between Turkish unit-value figures and those of other countries was slightly
greater. A similar pattern was found for other groups.
Considering the probable magnitude of under-invoicing (at most 50 per
cent) and the disparity in recorded imports, it can be presumed that synthetic
fibers (which were on the Quota Lists and generally commanded high premia —
seeTable VI-! 1 below) were both under-invoiced and imported under licenses
other than those issued directly for those goods. Thus part of the restrictive-
ness of commodity.specific licensing (and the "Prohibited List") was un-
doubtedly offset by under-invoicing and erroneous classification of imports
into eligible import commodities.
Kayra estimated the value of Turkish imports for the period 1963 to 1969
on the basis of his detailed study of partner country trade statistics. His
results, given in Table VI-9, indicate that actual imports by Turkey were an
average of about $60 million over recorded imports in the years 1963 to
1965, implying underinvoicing of about 10 per cent. And the magnitude of
the phenomenon increased sharply thereafter, reaching over $190 miffion in
1969.
Table Vt-9
Official statistics and Kayra's estimates of imports, 1963 to 1969 (millions of dollars)
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Turkish trade
statistics 688 537 572 718 685 764 801
Kayra's estimates748 577 645 815 836 882 993
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Many goods were imported by the public sector or financed with project
credits and therefore were presumably not significantly under-invoiced. For
private sector imports, therefore, the magnitude of underrecording of imports
was substantial by any standard.
There can be little doubt that under-invoicing and falsely classifying im-
ports made the import regime less restrictive than it would have been in the
absence of those practices. However, it will be seen in Section V that despite
the leakages in the system the premia accruing to import licenses were sub-
stantial.
Smuggling.By its nature, smuggling is a more difficult activity to try to
quantify than is faked invoicing, and all that can be done is to provide
impressionistic evidence. For a variety of reasons, it would appear that smug-
gling was concentrated on consumer goods. First, most consumer goods
were not legally importable, and are, by their nature, difficult to misclassify
into an eligible import category. Second, there have generally been very high
disparities between foreign and domestic prices of consumer goods, so that
smuggling of those items was probably more profitable than smuggling other
categories of goods.
From personal experience, the author can report finding an incredible
variety of imported goods not eligible for importation on the shelves of local
groceries and in the windows of various shops: canned American salted pea-
nuts, gum, foreigncigarettes, German phonographs, Nabisco crackers,
German and American baby food, and so on. As mentioned in Chapter V,
smuggling was so widespread that its existence was officially acknowledged at
the end of the FFYP. There is every reason to believe that in the early years
of the SFYP, smuggling activity grew as the stringency of the import regime
increased. Beyond the fact that sale of smuggled goods was fairly open and
that prices of black-market merchandise were generally well known, it is
impossible to estimate the magnitude of the phenomenon.
V. Import EERs and premia: the 1960's
As seen in Chapter IV, the 1958—1960 devaluation did not result in any
significant change in the ratio of import EERs to export EERs. In this section
the course of import EERs throughout the 1960's is traced, and the premia
accruing to license recipients are estimated for 1968.
Import EERs
Details of the method of computation of EERs are given in Appendix A.I
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In addition to basic tariff rates which were altered in 1964, several surcharges
and the discriminatory component of the production tax led to sizeable
differentials between the c.i.f. price and the landed cost of an import, and the
c.i.f. and landed costs of imports.
Table VI-lO gives the import EERs for the 1960's based on Tables A-i 1 to
A-l4 and also presents PLD-EERs. EERs were deflated by use of the home
goods price computed on a 1958 base. A higher PLD-EER implies a more
depreciated exchange rate for the category of goods in question.
All categories of imports became cheaper in real terms during the 1960's.
Relative to home goods, imported capital goods were almost 30 per cent
cheaper in 1969 than they were in 1960, even taking into account duties and
surcharges. That was of course partly the result of the removal and postpone-
Table VI-lO
Import EERs and PLD-EERs, by end-use category of imports, 1960 to1969












1960 1211 13.25 21.22 18.66
1961 12.55 13.25 21.22 18.66
1962 12.54 13.12 18.96 15.78
1963 12.99 13.57 19.41 16.23
1964 12.99 13.57 19.41 16.23
1965 15.50 14.79 23.01 17.75
1966 15.50 14.79 23.01 17.75
1967 15.29 15.24 23.46 18.20
1968 12.26 16.15 21.98 18.79
1969 13.16 17.05 21.98 19.69
PLD-EERs
1960 10.35 11.32 18.13 15.95
1961 10.54 11.13 17.83 15.68
1962 10.03 10.49 15.17 14.70
1963 9.84 10.28 14.70 12.30
1964 10.14 10.60 15.16 12.68
1965 11.48 10.96 17.04 13.14
1966 10.61 10.13 15.76 12.16
1967 10.09 9.65 14.85 11.52
1968 7.52 9.91 13.48 11.64
1969 7.44 9.63 12.96 11.12
Notes:a) For definitions of categories of imports, see Appendix A.
b) PLD-EERs are 1958 TL per dollar c.i.f. price.
Source:Appendix A.The Import Regime of the 1960's
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ment of duties upon capital goods in the late 1960's. However, imports
competing with domestic goods became relatively cheaper by the same pro-
portion, while imported consumer goods were 31 per cent cheaper in terms of
home goods in 1969 than they were in 1960. The price of imported inter-
mediate goods in terms of home goods fell only 15 per cent from 1960 to
1969. Thus, whereas capital goods and raw materials and intermediate goods
imports had similar EERs in the early 1960's, intermediate goods imports
became relatively more expensive in the late 1960's.
This shift in the structure of EERs reflects the SPO's desire to increase the
fraction of foreign exchange allocated to capital goods imports. As noted
above, raw materials and intermediate goods imports were consistently above
planned levels in the mid-1960's, while capital goods imports were below
desired levels. The remission of duties and surcharges on capital goods im-
ports was therefore designed to alter the relationship between the two import
classes.
Itis more difficult to determine the reason why the EERs for imports
competing with domestic production retained their parity with capital goods
during the 1960's. The absolute differential between the capital goods and
the other two classes was of course high at the start of the period. Thus even
without allowing for price deflation there was little movement in the EER of
imports competing with domestic output over the 1960's. It fell somewhat in
the early years, and rose thereafter. Another factor should be considered,
however, and that is that the EERS were calculated from the sample of
commodities eligible for importation. It is quite possible that the increasing
use of the "Prohibited List" as more and more goods were domestically
produced resulted in a bias in the estimate of import EERs for consumer
goods and import substitutes. Inspection of the list of goods included in each
sample suggests that there was some bias toward retaining the cqmmodities
with relatively lower EERS on the eligible list. Thus the EER estimates can in
no way be interpreted as the degree of protection afforded to the two catego-
ries of goods.
Import premia
As indicated above, there was considerable activity in the resale of imports
and import licenses, both legally and otherwise. Even for Liberalized List
items, the fact that delays in receipts of licenses could be protracted meant
that the domestic price of such imports could exceed landed cost by more
than the normal distributors' markup. For items on the Quota List, the
detailed, fi.rm.specific allocations resulted in an even greater potential for
resale, as well as a divergence between landed cost and the domestic price.
Detailed estimates of the premia accruing to license recipients are available
IThe Import Regime of the 1960's
only for 1968. The only available evidence for earlier years is based upon the
author's interviews with businessmen and observers. Interviews with business-
men were conducted by the author in 1965, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1971.
Businessmen not only were asked what the then-prevailing prices on import
licenses were, but also were queried as to their recollection of premia for
earlier periods. The responses were necessarily impressionistic, but were sur-
prisingly consistent between interviews and over time. The consensus appear-
ed to be the following.
Premia for licenses in the 1955-to-1958 period ranged up to TL 20—25 per
dollar, or eight times the parity rate. The resale market all but disappeared
after devaluation in 1958, and premia on licenses were negligible up to 1962.
Premia reemerged for some items by 1963, but it was rare that they were
more than TL 1to 2 per dollar. By 1964 however (as foreign aid failed to
reach anything near Plan levels and imports rose in response to Plan expendi-
tures) premia jumped to a range of TL 4—6 per dollar, representing 40—66
per cent of the c.i.f. cost of imports, but a far smaller percentage of landed
cost (because of duties and surcharges on imports). Premia remained within
the TL 4—6 range in 1965 and 1966, but rose to TL 7—9 per dollar, almost
100 per cent, by 1967. They were considerably higher by 1968, and the
variation in price among import categories increases sharply. The average
price of import licenses in 1968 and 1969 ranged from TL 9 to TL 15 per
dollar, or 100 to 166 per cent above the c.i.f. price. Premia were substantially
reduced after devaluation in 1970, and there was little reported resale of
licenses at the end of 1970.
While the emerging picture is necessarily impressionistic, it is useful in
putting the 1968 situation in perspective. An excellent set of data for 1968
exists with which to evaluate the relationship between c.i.f. prices, landed
cost and import premia. In the summer of that year Professor Ahmet Aker of
Robert College (now Bogazici Universitesi) conducted interviews with nu-
merous firms in the Istanbul area. He sought to obtain comparable data on
the c.i.f. prices, landed costs and wholesale prices of identical commodities,
and succeeded in obtaining comparable price quotations at all three levels for
74 commodities, representing 8.6 per cent of Turkey's total import bill. In his
judgment these figures were reliable.
Table VI-1 1 reproduces his price data. As can be seen in the next-to-last
column, there was a sizeable variation in the relationship between wholesale
prices and landed costs.3' Some commodities, such as lanolin and synthetic
thread, sold in the wholesale market at little above their landed cost. Of
31. The estimate of landed costs includes the duties, surcharges and production taxes
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Table VI-! 1
Import prices, landed costs and wholesale prices, 1968
175
Commodity
TL per Unit Ratio
ImportLandedWhole-LandedWhole- Whole-
Price Cost sale Cost tosale Pricesale Price
c.i.f. Price Importto Landedto Import
Price Cost Price
Pigs' bristles 58.3580.60 475.0 1.38 5.89 8.14
Dates 0.06 0.13 6.5 2.17 49.10 108.33
Unroasted coffee 7.34 13.31 36.0 1.81 2.90 4.90
Black peppers 7.19 15.14 29.0 2.10 1.91 4.03
Cloves 7.62 13.20 23.5 1.73 1.78 3.08
Henna 2.94 5.83 11.0 1.98 1.89 3.74
Shellac 6.97 13.65 16.0 1.95 1.17 2.29
Gum arabic 2.77 6.29 13.5 2.27 2.15 4.87
Lard 2.33 3.92 12.0 1.68 3.06 5.15
Lanolin 6.46 10.88 12.0 1.68 1.10 1.86
Hint oil 3.23 4.85 9.5 1.50 1.96 2.94
Cocoa oil 3.17 5.33 60.0 1.68 11.26 18.93
Sunflower oil 2.53 4.25 5.9 1.68 1.39 2.33
Oleic acid 2.64 4.40 5.5 1.67 1.25 2.08
Cocoa beens 3.87 8.29 40.02.14 4.83 10.34
Copra oil 8.14 18.72 32.0 2.30 1.71 3.93
Whiskey 9.70 29.92 85.0 3.08 2.84 8.76
Portland cement 0.09 0.15 0.2 1.66 1.33 2.22
Gas oil 0.30 0.70 0.8 2.33 1.14 2.67
Motor oil 0.19 0.56 0.8 2.95 1.42 4.21
Vaseline 1.94 3.18 5.0 1.64 1.57 2.58
Sulphuric acid 0.25 0.44 1.0 1.76 2.27 4.00
Zinc oxide 2.42 3.88 5.5 1.60 1.42 2.27
Titanium oxides 3.99 6.10 8.5 1.53 1.39 2.13
Sodium hydrosulfide 3.50 5.08 7.5 1.45 1.48 2.14
Sodium bicarbonate 0.50 0.79 1.4 1.58 1.77 2.80
Sodium carbonate 0.44 0.62 1.2 1.41 1.93 2.73
Potassium carbonate 1.71 2.73 3.7 1.60 1.36 2.47
Trichlorethylene 1.50 2.23 3.5 1.49 1.57 2.33
Pure methyl alcohol 2.41 3.86 4.5 1.60 1.17 1.87
Acetone 1.68 2.93 3.5 1.74 1.19 2.08
Printing inks 8.22 12.18 60.0 1.48 4.92 7.30
Talloil 1.74 2.44 5.5 1.40 2.25 3.16
Synthetic rubber 3.86 6.45 42.0 1.67 6.51 10.88
Tires 10.62 21.94 25.0 2.07 1.14 2.35I
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Table VI-! 1 (continued)
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TL per unit Ratio
ImportLandedWhole-LandedWhole- Whole-
Price Cost sale Cost tosale Pricesale Price
c.i.f. Price Importto Landedto Import
Price Cost Price
Inner tubes 10.5021.69 80.0 2.07 3.69 7.62
Natural cork 1.67 2.11 5.0 1.26 2.37 2.99
Cords of synthetic
continuous fiber 9.3722.47 35.0 2.40 1.56 3.74
Continuous silk fiber 8.01 19.21 29.0 2.40 1.51 3.62
Synthetic thread 14.25 34.19 35.0 2.40 1.02 2.46
Silk thread 8.32 19.9640.0 2.40 2.00 4.81
Synthetic textiles 23.31 35.70175.0 1.53 4.90 7.51
Merinowool 11.20 14.11 30.0 1.26 2.13 2.68
Synthetic fibers 8.92 13.4747.5 1.51 3.53 5.33
Artificial fibers 3.87 6.98 52.5 1.80 7.52 13.56
Jute fiber 2.89 3.64 5.5 1.26 1.51 1.90
Jute yarn 3.75 8.12 11.0 2.17 1.35 2.93
Quilting material 0.50 0.78 2.5 1.56 3.21 5.00
Iron +steelbars or con-
cretes which have
I profile 1.03 1.71 2.5 1.66 1.46 2.43
Iron +steelbars or con-
cretes which have
H profile 1.00 1.67 3.0 1.67 1.80 3.00
Magnetic sheets 1.20 2.27 2.9 1.89 1.28 2.42
Thick and thin pipes made
of cast iron 4.30 7.47 35.0 1.74 4.69 8.14
Unpiated pipes, diameters
to 3 fingers 2.41 4.46 4.5 1.85 1.01 1.87
Plated pipes, diameters
to 3 fingers 2.17 3.01 9.0 1.39 2.99 4.15
Zinc 3.07 5.37 22.0 1.75 4.10 7.17
Air pumps 254 417 2000 1.64 4.80 7.87
Refrigeration units 990 2080 3000 2.10 1.44 3.03
Lathes 1179 1930 8500 1.64 4.40 7.21
Cutting machinery 2898 4746 6500 1.64 1.37 2.24
Typewriters 432 697 1375 1.61 1.97 3.18
1—2 HP electric motors 87 137 300 1.57 2.19 3.45
3—10 HP electric motors300 475 750 1.58 1.58 2.50
Source:Data kindly provided
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course landed cost itself was considerably above the c.i.f price, but none-
theless there were no premia associated with the importation of these com-
modities. For many commodities, however, premia were substantial. For
thirty-one commodities in the sample —almosthalf —thepremium exceeded
the landed cost of the import. There were only four commodities in the
sample where the wholesale domestic price of the item was less than double
the c.i.f. price. The landed cost estimates relative to the c.Lf price estimates
accord closely with the EER estimates given in Appendix A whenever items
are found in both samples. But confirming the impressions given by excess
demand for licenses, there was little relationship between the height of the
EER and the domestic wholesale price of the commodity. Distributors, sub-
ject to only 31 per cent duties and surcharges, sold domestically for more
than seven times the c.i.f. price, for example. Passenger cars, subject to 159
per cent duties and surchanges, sold for about 3½ times their ci.f. price. Thus
the premia on import licenses varied considerably from commodity to com-
modity, as expected under a quota system. And the tariffs and surcharges
absorbed different fractions of the domestic/foreign price differential in the
various commodity categories.
To obtain an estimate of the importance of the premia relative to duties
and surcharges, the 1967 value of imports of each commodity in the sample
was obtained. The value of the premia as given by Aker was then computed








































TL per unit Ratio
ImportLandedWhole-LandedWhole- Whole-
Price Cost sale Cost tosale Pricesale Price
c.i.f. Price Importto Landedto Import
Price Cost Price
Vacuum cleaners 371 822 15002.22 1.82 4.04
Distributors 38 50 275 1.31 5.50 7.24
Automatic telephone 32 61 250 1.91 4.10 7.81
Wire telephone parts 36 68 1901.89 2.79 5.28
Loudspeakers 25 37 601.48 1.62 2.40
Small tractors 765412,22750,0001.60 4.09 6.53
Medium tractors 13,91222,29762,5001.60 2.80 4.49
Large tractors 32,80852,58267,500 1.60 1.28 2.06
Passenger cars 16,15241,90257,5002.59 1.37 3.56
Motorcycles 1428 2841 50001.99 1.76 3.50
Kilowatthourmeters 29 63 1902.17 3.02 6.55
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of the computations were:
Value of imports in the sample, c.i.f.
Landed cost of imports
Wholesale value of imports
Premia:
20 per cent markup
50 per cent markup
100 per cent markup
The average EER for the sample was thus TL 23.76$1 contrasted with the
official rate of TL 9 =$1.This EER is slightly above the rate calculated in
Appendix A. The premium, however, equalled TL 3021, TL 23.1, or TL
11.22, depending upon the assumption made about the normal mark-up. That
would vary from one product to another, but in this author's judgment a 50
per cent mark-up is probably the best estimate. On that basis, a dollar's worth
of imports cost the importer TL 23.76, and his return from it was TL 58.75,
giving him an average windfall gain, or premium, of TL 23.11 per TL 9 of
licenses received.
Thus by 1968 the premium on import licenses was considerably in excess
of the duties and surcharges imposed upon imports. Industrialists receiving
import licenses for intermediate goods imports were, in effect, subsidized by
the amount of the premium they received, and protected by the amount of
the EER plus the premium on imports competing with their own production.
The premia associated with £mal outputs were at least as high as those on
intermediate goods, and frequently were much higher. For domestic pro-
ducers of those goods, therefore, the protection afforded through quantita-
tive restrictions considerably exceeded that through tariffs and surcharges.
Quantitative restrictions were thus of much greater importance than price
interventions in providing incentives for import-substituting production.
The resource allocational and growth effects of these powerful incentives
for import-substitution wifi be examined in Chapters VIII and IX. First how-
ever, attention must be devoted to the differential incentives for exports and
their effects, the subject of Chapter VII.